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ABSTRACT
DETECTION OF DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS
USING DATABASE QUERIES
by
Dmytro Zakhalyavko
In the current intrusion detection world, most intrusion detection
systems output data into flat files. This project was conducted in order
to improve intrusion detection data and alerts by writing them into a
database system and analyzing them with SQL. A database plug-in
was developed that helps to transition the data from an intrusion
detection system to a database. Storing, analyzing, categorizing, and
accessing data are major advantages and reasons for using databases
in intrusion detection. Security analysts have to constantly perform
the difficult task of sorting through a haystack of attack alerts, many
of which turn out to be inaccurate. It is possible to make the job of
managing these alerts, analyzing data with high precision, and
searching for attacks or intrusions easier by using SQL based analysis.
In addition, a statistical analysis was conducted and proved that such
a method can be effective in detecting intrusions and increasing the
security of the network.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
There are multiple ways to analyze [1,2], store and retrieve intrusion
detection data. The most logical one would be to store it inside of a
database. This approach also introduces a convenient and easy way of
detecting attacks through writing SQL queries. A recent survey [3] by
CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center)
showed that the rate of cyber attacks has more than doubled every
year since 1998 (see Figurel). We need to find the best ways to make
information systems immune to such attacks.
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Many researches [4,5,6,9] proved that data mining is not only
useful but necessary in detecting attacks and analyzing intrusion
detection data. However, few have tried to integrate data mining
techniques into detecting attacks with the help of database collecting
information about the network traffic. In this paper I tried to prove
that the method of using databases in intrusion detection and
detecting attacks using SQL queries is worthwhile doing and can
compete with other techniques [2].
CHAPTER 2
NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION
2.1 Introduction to Network Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection in networks is mainly done by means of Network
Intrusion Detections Systems [8]. Such a system monitors the traffic
on its network segment as a data source. This is generally
accomplished by placing the network interface card in promiscuous
mode to capture all network traffic that crosses its network segment.
Network traffic on other segments and traffic on other means of
communication (like phone lines) cannot be monitored.
There are basically two types of intrusion detection techniques:
Anomaly detection and Misuse detection. The most current intrusion
detection systems use both techniques.
2.2 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection models the normal behavior profile of the traffic in
a network. Any events that violate this model are flagged as an
intrusion. A profile usually consists of a number of statistical
measures on network traffic activities, such as bursts of certain traffic
parameters that were not recorded in the normal profile. Deviation
3
4from a profile can be computed as the weighted sum of deviations of
the constituent statistical measures [6]. Profiles can be aged so that
shifts of normal behavior are accounted for. The advantage of
anomaly detection is that it can detect unknown intrusions without any
prior knowledge about specific intrusions [7]. Intrusive activity,
however, does not always coincide with anomalous activity. Four
types of possible activities are listed below:
1. Intrusive but not anomalous. These classify as false
negatives or type I errors, meaning that the activity is intrusive but
because it is not anomalous, the Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
fails to detect it. They are called false negatives because the system
falsely reports that there was no intrusion.
2. Not intrusive but anomalous. These are false negative or
type II errors. The activity is not intrusive but because it is
anomalous, IDS reports it as intrusive. It is named in such a way
because the intrusion is falsely reported.
3. Not intrusive and not anomalous. These are definitely
negatives; the activity is not intrusive and is not reported as intrusive.
4. Intrusive and anomalous. These are definitely positives;
the activity is intrusive and is reported as such because it is
anomalous.
Anomaly detection suffers from accuracy problems, as building
an accurate profile to avoid false negatives may not fully reflect the
complex dynamic nature of computer systems leading to false
positives.
2.3 Misuse Detection
The main assumption of misuse intrusion detection is that there are
attacks that can be precisely encoded in a manner that captures
rearrangements and variations of activities that exploit the same
vulnerability. In other words it uses patterns of known intrusions
called signatures that are first given to IDS to identify intrusions. The
key advantage of misuse detection is that once the patterns of known
intrusions are stored, future instances of these intrusions can be
detected effectively and efficiently. Newly invented attacks, however,
will likely go undetected, which leads to unacceptable false negative
error rates.
Network-based Intrusion Detection that uses exclusively
misuse detection involves looking at the packets on the network as
they pass by some sensor. The sensor can only see the packets that
happen to be carried on the network segment to which it is attached.
Packets are considered to be of interest if they match a signature.
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Three primary types of signatures are string signatures, port
signatures, and header condition signatures.
6
CHAPTER 3
DATA MINING IN INTRUSION DETECTION
In today's world, nearly every company is dependent on the Internet
to survive, and it is therefore not surprising that the role of network
intrusion detection has grown so rapidly [9]. While there may still be
some argument as to what is the best way to protect companies'
networks (i.e. firewalls, patches, intrusion detection, training, etc.), it
is certain that the Intrusion Detection Systems will likely maintain an
important role in providing for a secure network architecture.
Unfortunately, Intrusion Detection Systems are currently not at their
best because they are not capable of identifying all the intrusions (or
attempted intrusions).
3.1 Data Mining Definitions
R.L. Grossman in "Data Mining: Challenges and Opportunities for Data
Mining during the Next Decade", defines data mining as being
"concerned with uncovering patterns, associations, changes,
anomalies, and statistically significant structures and events in data."
Simply put it is the ability to take data and pull from it patterns or
7
8deviations which may not be seen easily to the naked eye. Another
term sometimes used is knowledge discovery.
Many different types of data mining algorithms exist today,
including link analysis, clustering, association, rule abduction,
deviation analysis, and sequence analysis.
Most, if not all, IDS that can be purchased today are based on
misuse detection. Current IDS products come with a large set of
signatures, which have been identified as unique to a particular
vulnerability or exploit. Most IDS vendors also provide regular
signature updates in an attempt to keep pace with the rapid
appearance of new vulnerabilities and exploits.
3.2 Shortfalls of Data Mining
While the ability to develop and use signatures to detect attacks is a
useful and viable approach, there are shortfalls to only using this
approach, which should be addressed.
Variants. As stated previously signatures are developed in
response to new vulnerabilities or exploits, which have been posted or
released. A signature must be unique enough to only alert on
malicious traffic and rarely on valid network traffic. The difficulty here
is that exploit code can often be easily changed. It is not uncommon
9for an exploit tool to be released and then have its defaults changed
shortly thereafter by the hacker community.
False positives. A common complaint is that the IDS generates
too many false positives. It is much more difficult to pick out a valid
intrusion attempt if a signature also alerts regularly on valid network
activity. The difficulty here is figuring out how much to filter without
potentially missing an actual attack.
False negatives. False negatives arise from detecting attacks
for which there are no known signatures. This leads to the other
concept of false negatives where the IDS does not generate an alert
when an intrusion is actually taking place.
Data overload. Another aspect which does not relate directly to
misuse detection but is extremely important is the quantity of data
that an analyst effectively and efficiently analyze. That being said the
amount of data he/she needs to look at seems to be growing rapidly.
Depending on the intrusion detection tools employed by a company
and its size there is the possibility for the number of logs to reach
millions of records per day.
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3.3 How Can Data Mining Help?
Data mining can help improve intrusion detection by adding a level of
focus to anomaly detection. By identifying bounds for valid network
activity, data mining will aid an analyst in his/her ability to distinguish
attack activity from common everyday traffic on the network.
Variants. Since anomaly detection is not based on pre-defined
signatures, the concern with variants in the code of an exploit is not as
great because we are looking for abnormal activity versus a unique
signature. An example might be a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) buffer
overflow exploit whose code has been modified slightly to evade an
IDS using signatures. With anomaly detection, the activity would be
flagged since the destination machine has never seen an RPC
connection attempt and the source IP was never seen connecting to
the network.
False positives. In regards to false positives, there has been
some work to determine if data mining can be used to identify
recurring sequences of alarms in order to help identify valid network
activity, which can be filtered out.
False negatives. By attempting to establish patterns for normal
activity and identifying the activity which lies outside identified
bounds, attacks for which signatures have not been developed might
11
be detected. An extremely simple example of how this would work
would be to take a web server and develop a profile of the network
activity seen to and from the system. Let us say that the web server
is locked down and only connections to ports 80 and 443 are ever seen
to the server. Thus, whenever a connection to a port other than 80 or
443 is seen, the IDS should identify that as an anomaly. While this
example is quite simple this could be extended to profiling, not only
individual hosts, but entire networks, users, traffic based on days of
the week or hours in a day, etc.
Data overload. The area where data mining is sure to play a
vital role is in the area of data reduction. With current data mining
algorithms there exists the capability to identify or extract data, which
is most relevant, and provide analysts with different "views" of the
data to aid in their analysis.
3.4 Difficulties with Data Mining in Intrusion Detection
The concept of data mining has been around for many years. Despite
this, data mining in intrusion detection is a relatively new concept.
Thus, there will likely be obstacles in developing an effective solution.
One is the fact that even though the concept of data mining has been
around for some time, the amount of data to be analyzed and its
12
complexity is increasing dramatically. As stated previously, it is
possible for a company to collect millions of records per day, which
need to be analyzed for malicious activity. With this amount of data to
analyze, one can guess that data mining will become quite
computationally expensive. Unfortunately, processing power or
memory is not always cheap or available. Of course, there may be the
argument that you only need samples of the data in order to generate
profiles, but analyzing anything, especially network traffic, without all
the data could lead to false conclusions. Another obstacle will be
tailoring data mining algorithms and processes to fit intrusion
detection. An effort to identify how the data needs to be looked at in
order to provide us with a better picture is integral in providing
accurate and effective results.
Obviously data mining and anomaly detection is not a silver
bullet for intrusion detection, nor should it be a replacement for
misuse detection. The goal should be to effectively integrate anomaly
detection and misuse detection to create an IDS, which will allow an
analyst to more accurately and quickly identify an attack or intrusion
on their network.
CHAPTER 4
INTRUSION DETECTION WITH SQL ANALYSIS AND DATABASE
IDS INTEGRATION
4.1 Novelties of Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection systems even well configured ones that utilize
data-mining techniques, are rather common in companies that care
about their security and non-vulnerability. Just like anything else in
the world, intrusion detection systems are not perfect.
Here are some basic drawbacks of current IDS products that limit
effectiveness of this security solution [10]:
Detection Accuracy - Current IDS products are noted for generating a
high rate of false positives.
Enterprise Scalability - Network IDS deployments are now enterprise
scale. The concept of "small" and "big" networks has significantly
changed in the past years. Two years ago, a network of 50 sensors
was considered large, but today networks consisting of hundreds of
sensors are not uncommon. Network IDS has to keep up with the
enterprise scale in order to function appropriately.
Product complexity - Today's IDS are still difficult to install, update
and manage on a daily basis.
Growing IDS Evasion - new and polymorphic attacks are used very
widely and can easily go around most IDS products.
13
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Performance barriers - keeping up speed of traffic and attack
detection.
Passive device - IDS are considered to be non-critical devices because
of their passiveness while detecting attacks. Preventing attacks is
considered more important. It needs to be understood that detection is
much more valuable than prevention.
Last but not least is intrusion detection management - with millions of
records per day, hundreds or thousands of alerts are certainly
overwhelming to security administrators, and of course, this prevents
them from doing their primary job efficiently.
There is a clear need for development and improvement in this
area. One of the improvements that is just starting make its way into
the intrusion detection world is logging to database system. Most
intrusion detection systems log to a flat file, which is later analyzed by
some specially designed programs or manually browsed by security
analysts of the company.
4.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Database Logging
Clearly, nobody wants to manually go through hundreds of thousands
or millions of lines of logs and alerts, and even worse try to make
sense out of them. Some systematic advanced technological process
has to be developed. I did extensive research in this area and
15
discovered that logging intrusion detection data to a database would
create multiple advantages. Information that is being written into the
database can successfully and efficiently be:
Stored - no limit on the size of the database, such database
systems as Oracle are very robust and can handle enormous chunks of
data. A flat file can grow uncontrollably and eventually take up all of
the memory, causing a system crash or an intrusion detection system
malfunction.
Analyzed - by means of Structured Query Language (SQL), data
in the database can be easily found, classified, analyzed and
researched.
Categorized - multiple tables for multiple periods of time could
be created, then linked together for more functional design.
Accessed - data access is also a very important aspect.
Database systems provide easy access to the required information at
any time of day or night from any location, whereas it might be hard
and insecure to share a file on the network.
Disadvantage of such an improvement is an insignificant
increase of local traffic and response time. It is understandable that if
a database system includes numerous amounts of records, the
response time would not be immediate, but would nevertheless be
within a reasonable limit.
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4.3 Project Description and Analysis
4.3.1 Two Models
I propose and describe two models in this project. The first model is a
local area network or a segment of a computer network that has at
least one sensor, an intrusion detection system running on it, and a
database server that will accept logs and alerts written into it. One or
more sensors detect attacks, while intrusion detection system outputs
data into the database system as shown on Figure 4.1. A security
analyst has access to the database server, and will analyze data
collected from the whole network.
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The second model is a little bit more complicated. It has one
secure centralized database server and multiple intrusion detection
systems (they do not even have to be of the same vendor) on different
networks. ID systems connect to the database server and write alerts
into it. This model is designed for detecting attacks on a larger scale
and can give a better understanding of the types of attacks that are
launched and possible ways to stop them. This model can be seen in
Figure 4.2.
Let us consider an example. A fairly large company has multiple
sites at different geographic locations and, therefore, multiple
networks. Let us assume that each network has an intrusion detection
system running on it. In a regular environment, intrusion detection
18
systems detect some of the attacks that are launched against that
particular network. They are not detecting attacks on a global basis,
however, where a simple port sweep on one segment of the network,
might be part of an attack on the whole enterprise. Therefore, if all
intrusion detection systems would write data into a centralized
database server, it would be much easier and possible to detect global
attacks. Failure to realize global attacks can lead to catastrophic
consequences and loss of money. This is also a very good way of
detecting new types of viruses, worms and security holes - if each IDS
reports unusual number of similar attacks, it may be that a new virus
or a worm is trying to compromise the network or individual machines.
This system can help eliminate the virus spread and allow a faster
response to obtain and apply security updates.
It may be argued that the security of the database server would
be of question. It is understandable that information is of a high value
and has to be protected very well. One of the ways to protect the flow
of the data between the intrusion detection system and database
system is secure logging using Stunnel. This approach involves
encryption of traffic between the IDS and the database server using
Stunnel or Secure Tunnel, which is an open source package [11] that
provides a secure tunnel between two hosts. It can even serve as a
simplification, because after the configuration of Stunnel, IDS can be
19
configured in such a way that it assumes that the database system is
running on the local machine and Stunnel transfers all the
communication to the remote database server.
4.3.2 Sharing Database System with Firewalls
A combination of an intrusion detection system, a database server,
and a firewall is also a very good example of improvement. This
approach gives the advantage of using existing investments in firewall
and IDS technology. If an attack was detected, an intrusion detection
system logs an alarm into the database, and from the alarm is sent to
the firewall. The firewall, inspects the alarm, finds the necessary
information, and blocks the offending traffic. This approach is effective
against some known attacks as well as brand new types of attacks. It
is especially effective against long-time running attacks that occur
over multiple packets, so that identification can be made earlier.
Unfortunately, this method is not very effective against initial single
packet attacks. This is so because by the time the attack is detected,
the single offending packet has already passed. It is possible however,
to block subsequent attacks.
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4.3.3 Data Mining Capabilities of SQL
SQL based analysis can be classified as a special data mining
technique. As mentioned earlier, the simplest definition of data mining
is "discovering interesting patterns". Researching data in the database
with the SQL technique matches this definition exactly. In addition,
different data types require different analysis methods. In this
project's database, each column already has a specific data type; so
one part of work is conveniently done already. The data is ready to be
analyzed.
Database mining[11], which incorporates the ability to directly access
data stored in a database, is one step beyond the core technology of
21
data mining. The distinction (database rather than data) might seem
to be a trivial improvement but like most transitions from technology
to solutions, it requires a major leap for developers.
4.3.4 Preliminary Research
I performed extensive research in order to pick tools, known
programming languages, and a database system for this project. I first
researched different database systems that match the project's needs
and are freely available. Two database systems supported by NJIT
were Oracle and MySQL. I considered installing my own database
server but because of lack of time and support I decided to go with a
system that is already installed, configured properly, and supported
and maintained professionally and constantly. Conveniently, NJIT
offered all of the above, so the Oracle database system was chosen,
mainly because of its known advances in robustness, stability,
properties and functionality over other database systems.
After the choice of Oracle was finalized, I found out that it
supports only two types of connections from outside, JDBC and
Pro*C/C++. Unfortunately, I did not know JDBC or the Java
programming language, so I had to choose Pro*C/C++.
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4.3.5 Programming
In order to make the intrusion detection system write data to the
Oracle database system, I had to write a program, using the
Pro*C/C++ precompiler. Oracle Pro*C/C++ Precompiler is a
programming tool that allows embedding SQL statements into a high-
level (C++) source program. The precompiler accepts the source
program as input, translates the embedded SQL statements into
standard Oracle runtime library calls, and generates a modified source
program that you can compile, link, and execute in the usual way.
This program takes outputted alert logs from an IDS, connects
to the database, logs in with username and password, and uses SQL
statements to write data into the table of Oracle database. Although it
seemed like a trivial task, the program was rather difficult to complete,
primarily because of low informational resources and references. The
source code for the program is available (in the appendix) at the end
of the paper.
The program can also be thought as Database Plugin for an
intrusion detection system. What is valuable is that the plugin can be
applied not to a specific intrusion detection system, but to various
types of IDS (misuse or anomaly type), with only minor code
modifications to compensate for output differences. In our case, the
plugin is specific to the Oracle database system. It should not be a
23
problem, in any case, because Oracle is very widely used in the world
of database systems.
4.3.6 Query-Based Analysis
Once the data from an intrusion detection system is fed into the
database, we can do something with it. Because SQL is proven to be
the most reliable way to pull the data from a database, it seems logical
to use it for this project.
4.3.6.1 Alert Management. There are two datasets that were used
in this project. One is a sample alert log that was obtained from one of
the graduate students, who developed a custom intrusion detection
system at NJIT. The format of the alert log is the following:
Date - date of the attack was attempted;
Time - time of the attack was attempted;
Server IP - IP address of the target machine;
Client IP - IP address of the source machine;
Server port - Port of the target machine;
Client port - Port of the source machine;
Session entropy - the entropy of a server port being accessed - the
closer the value is to zero, the more likely that the port is accessed;
Service definition - a Boolean, indicating whether the server port is
actually opened (0: not open, 1: open);
Session suspiciousness - the likeliness that the session is actually an
attack session (<0 attack, >= 0 normal).
Using the mentioned fields and their meanings, appropriate
queries can be constructed.
Here are just some that are possible:
- Output all/some alerts for a particular date
- Output all/some alerts for a particular timeframe on a particular
date; insert'??' if seconds or minutes are not essential
- Output all/some alerts for IPs for a particular period of time
- what are the most aggressive IPs
- what IPs have been victims the most - that is of the greatest
interest of intruders
select DISTINCT C_IP
from LOG
24
where DT = INIM/DD/YYYY',
- what is the most popular protocol used by intruders for a particular
source IP, date range, timeframe, etc.
- Output all/some server/client ports (most popular port to be
scanned, least popular)
- Output if any ports were open for particular date
The queries listed above are relatively simple, however due to
broad SQL capabilities, more complex queries, such as nested queries,
can be in fact constructed. For example, we can output the IP
addresses of the attacker and target machine for a particular date,
specific time (to hour), for a particular protocol used, and whether the
attack was successful.
25
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Above data and queries are strictly for the purpose of helping
administrators and network security personnel manage alerts.
In addition to creating queries, stored procedures and triggers
can also be programmed for better analysis purposes. Needless to say,
the time it takes for a query to be executed and to return results is
very short. Considering the amount of records in an intrusion detection
database, this is a very good way to obtain needed information,
especially when it is urgently needed.
4.3.6.2 Network Data and Query-Based Statistical Analysis. To
prove that database systems and SQL techniques are useful in
intrusion detection and worthwhile doing, statistical analysis of the
intrusion detection data was conducted.
The second data set that was used is the DARPA'98 IDEVAL data,
generated by MIT Lincoln labs in 1998 as the intrusion detection offline
evaluation project sponsored by DARPA [13]. This data was collected
in an isolated controlled network environment with simulated normal
background traffic and attacks. Only DOS and probing attacks are
considered in our experiment. The original DARPA data is organized by
a total of 7 weeks. I analyzed all of seven weeks of this data.
27
There are two approaches to represent traffic features of
intrusion detection systems [2]. Most systems measure the average
rates, or the number of occurrences of the selected traffic parameters
and normalize these parameters using the means and standard
deviations, which are maintained in a reference models. In data, that I
used, network features are represented in probability density functions
(PDF) and using similarity metrics. This data is being called DISTANCE
data.
There are 45 different network parameters in this data set and
one label that signifies whether a particular record is an attack or valid
network traffic. A value of 1 -1' means that it is an attack and a value of
'1' means that it is non-attack.
The purpose of doing the analysis is to try to see how many
attacks we can successfully predict, matching our predictions to attack
truths that are available to us in the 'label' column.
A new database table was created and with a few modifications
to the program that was described earlier all the data in the data set
was loaded into the Oracle database.
However, before creating SQL queries for statistical analysis, I
needed to know which fields and how, influences the fact if there was
an attack or no. Therefore, I performed a field analysis - I looked for
28
patterns in the data and tried to identify which fields are most
important in identifying attacks.
Each of the 45 fields was graphed for each of the seven weeks
of DARPA data set. Because SQL itself does not provide graphical
capabilities and Oracle visualization modules were not available during
this project, the data was graphed in MS Excel. An example of a valid
useful pattern can be seen on Figure 4.4. The figure represents two
graphs of the same field; with the top graph depicted attack data and
the bottom depicting valid traffic. The difference is clearly noticeable -
most of the attacks have negative value for this field, however non-
attack data has only positive values.
Figure 4.4 Field 'Input TCP SYN Packet Rate' for attack data
(top graph) and non-attack data (bottom graph).
As I graphed each field and queried for it in the database to
catch exceptions, I constructed the following list along with data
description and my observations.
in jp_pktlen = 1 only if it is legitimate traffic (except for week 5 -
one occurrence and week 7 - three occurrences)
in_ip_pkt_rate = 1 only if it is legitimate traffic
in jp_byt_rate and in_ip_pkt_rate are almost the same
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in_ip_frag_rate is <0 only in case of attack (finds very small number
of attacks)
in jp_defrag_rate and in_ip_frag_rate are almost the same
in_ip_csum_error_rate <0 only in case of an attack
in_tcp_pkt_rate = 1 only in case of legitimate traffic
in_tcp_syn_pkt_rate < 0 in case of attack (except for week? - one
occurrence, week5 - one occurrence, week3 - one occurrence)
in_tcp_fin_pkt_rate and in_tcp_syn_pkt_rate are very similar
in_tcp_rst_pkt_rate - attack and legitimate traffic data is very similar
in_tcp_con_new_opened < 0 only in case of an attack
in_tcp_con_new_closed and in_tcp_con_new_opened are very similar
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in_tcp_con_half_opened_ratio (no significant patterns found)
in_tcp_con_duration (no significant patterns found)
in_tcp_con_diff_src and in_tcp_con_duration are very similar
in_tcp_con_diff_src and in_tcp_con_diff_dst are very similar
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in_tcp_con_anomalous_entropy and in_tcp_con_diff_dst are very
similar
in_icmp_pkt_len (no significant patterns found)
in_icmp_pkt_rate < 0 in case of an attack
in jcmp_byt_rate and in_icmp_pkt_rate are very similar
in_jcmp_diff_src similar to in_icmp_byt_rate - not of significant value
in_udp_pkt_len (no significant patterns found)
in_udp_byt_rate and in_udp_pkt_rate are very similar
in_udp_diff_src - minor influence
(as it is seen, it is not worth taking this field into account, because
ratio of attacks detected and false positives is too high)
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out_ip_pkt_len - no significant patterns found
out_ip_pkt_rate - no significant patterns found
out_ip_byt_rate and out_ip_pkt_rate are very similar - no significant
patterns found
out_tcp_pkt_len - no significant patterns found
out_tcp_pkt_rate = 1 when the traffic is legitimate, except in week6
one occurrence
out_tcp_con_diffsrc - no significant patterns found
out_tcp_con_diff_dst - no significant patterns found
out_icmp_pkt_len - no significant patters found
out_icmp_pkt_rate < 0 in case of an attack
out_icmp_diff_src - no significant patterns found
out_icmp_diff_dst - no significant patterns found
out_udp_pkt_len - no significant patterns found
out_udp_pkt_rate - no significant patterns found
out_udp_diff_src - no significant patterns found
out_udp_diff_dst - no significant patterns found - redundant, similar
graph was observed before
io_icmp_anomalousecho_reply < 0 in case of attacks in all cases
After analyzing all DARPA data with the help of SQL queries and
Excel graphs, a list of most significant columns that are exclusively
negative in case of attacks was acquired:
in_ip_frag_rate, in_ip_csum_error_rate, in_tcp_syn_pkt_rate,
in_tcp_con_new_opened, in_icmp_pkt_rate, out_icmp_pkt_rate,
io_icmp_anomalousecho_reply
Based on the fields above, the following query was constructed:
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This query does not return any False Positives, which is good, however
it has higher number of False Negatives. Results of attack discovery, is
shown in the Table 4.1.
The formulas for the above columns are the following:
False Positives - the number of valid traffic samples classified as
attacks.
False Negatives - the number of attacks classified as valid traffic.
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False Positive Rate - the ratio between the false positives and total
number of valid traffic samples.
False Negative Rate - the ratio between the false negatives and the
total number of attack samples.
Misclassification Rate - the ratio between the total misclassifications
and the total number of samples. (FP + FN)/total
As we can see, that results are ambiguous. For weeks one,
three and seven, results were acceptable and even good, however for
other weeks despite the fact that there are no false positives, a lot of
attacks still left unidentified.
In order to improve results, based on the field analysis research,
I added more fields and obtained the following query:
Although this query introduces False Positives, it eliminates a lot of
False Negatives. Results of this query analysis are displayed in Table
4.2. Obvious improvements can be seen after including the above
listed fields.
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I am at present unaware of existence of similar analyses, and
therefore do no have at my disposal the results from such analysis.
However the evaluation of Feature-Extraction Algorithms has been
done in this area, on the same data set by Zheng Zhang [2].
We can compare our results against results of that study.
There were different classification architectures used. Table 4.3
shows result of Feature-Extraction Algorithm study.
1 able 4..i Kesuir or reawre-extracuon aigorimm sway.
In order to improve results, I tried to figure out what would be
the best threshold that should be in the query. Initially, it was zero. I
experimented with values from -0.5 to 0.4 and I obtained Table 4.4
For visualization purposes, I also constructed the graph that
can be observed in Figure 4.5
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It is seen from the table and the graph that the threshold value
with the smallest Misclassification rate is - 0.3, which equals to
As we can see the above SQL-based analysis along with field
study, gives the same order of results as such feature extraction
algorithms as Backpropagation Neural Network, Linear Vector
Quantization and Support Vector Machine for DISTANCE data.
Although the time that it takes for writing final SQL queries
may vary depending on the attack complication, once most of the
known attacks are figured out and SQL signatures are finished, the
speed of detecting attacks should increase.
4.3.6.3 Result Analysis. As can be seen from Table 4.5 that results
of the query-based SQL analysis vary from week to week. For weeks
one and three the results are very good, even better than Feature-
Extraction Algorithm study numbers. Weeks four, six and seven have
average results but weeks two and five have really high false negative
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rates. What is interesting in this study is that there are not many false
positives but many more false negatives. This may be because of the
way we analyzed the data - we considered only network features that
had the most impact on the detection of the attack, neglecting
features with smaller attack detection rates. One way to improve these
results would be to analyze more data, and try to identify more
patterns out of existing network features. Another way would be to
include more fields to reach the maximum level of detection of attacks,
but then the false positive rate will increase. Another good way of
improving results and automating the process of finding interesting
patterns would be writing stored procedures in our database. It would,
however, require higher-level programming and database
administration skills.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this project was to integrate a database system with
an intrusion detection system and with the help of SQL analysis, prove
that it will bring improvements to network security.
Leveraging the power of today's commercial database systems,
it is possible to simplify and improve the task of managing and
searching intrusion detection data. This project is an inexpensive and
well-performing way to make it easier for the administrators and
security personnel to archive, manipulate the information, audit and
mine the data, and easier for managers to interpret it. The results of
the analysis show that this can be an effective system with only a
0.001 misclassification rate. The system captured approximately 82%
of the attacks from a particular data set. Programming languages
such as Pro*C/C++ or Perl can create programs that would utilize SQL
queries in their statistical analysis algorithms to further automate the
process of detecting intrusions. If the latest statistical intrusion
detection algorithms are used in conjunction with such a system, the
capture rate will increase.
SQL and database systems alone cannot entirely perform
statistical analysis for us. They are, however, a means of storing,
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accessing, searching, and presenting data to analysts, allowing them
to be more efficient at their jobs.
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APPENDIX
SOURCE CODE OF THE PROGRAM THAT CONNECTS IDS
TO THE DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
How to compile:
First Pro*C file has to be compiled:
proc dbaccess.pc auto_connect=true
After it generates C file, we need to compile it:
gcc dbaccess.c -c
C file is compiled into the library and ready to be compiled into the
final program:
g++ sample5.cc dbaccess.o $ORACLE_HOME/1ib32/libcIntsh.so
Some environmental variables have to be set in order for the program
to work:
setenv LD_LIBRARY_PATH
"$ORACLE_HOME/1ib32:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
Source code of Pro*C file.
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